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Recent disaster statistics reflect an alarm- 
ing trend of increasing losses from natural 
disasters. Typically, the insurance industry, 
scientific experts, and thus the media, refer 
to such "external" factors as population 
increase, the potential for damage in haz- 
ard-prone areas, and land use and climate 
change as the primary causes of this trend. 
Although these factors increase vulnerability 
to natural disasters, we argue that "inter- 
nal" factors uch as disaster-related sci- 
ence and policy are also responsible for the 
inability to stem or reverse the upward trend 
in disaster damage. The paradox of concur- 
rent increases in economic loss and disas- 
ter-related research raises questions about 
the approaches and tools used in hazard 
assessment and disaster management. This 
in turn raises the possibility that progress is 
being blocked by fundamental conceptual 
barriers, in addition to profound changes in 
environmental and social processes, neither 
of which are adequately being addressed. 
We conclude with some thought-provoking 
suggestions for addressing problems in dis- 
aster management. 
Dramatic increase in disasters and 
economic loss 
Statistics on the frequency of major natu- 
ral disasters and losses resulting from dis- 
asters reveal two clear trends: major disas- 
ters and economic damage are both 
increasing (Figure 1). The common expla- 
nations for these trends focus on the 
inevitable consequences of development: 
climate change, population increase, 
assets in risk-prone areas (growth in Gross 
World Product), and poorly adapted land 
use changes that reduce the buffering 
capacity of landscapes. Few ponder the 
paradox that while losses from disasters 
and investment for research on disaster 
theory and methods are rising, our tools 
and techniques for hazard assessment and 
disaster management are increasingly 
being questioned. Since traditional knowl- 
edge and techniques have not reversed 
the upward trend in losses, it seems obvi- 
ous that fundamental conceptual barriers 
and profound changes in ecological, eco- 
nomic and social processes must be con- 
sidered as additional factors, especially in 
sensitive ecosystems such as mountain 
areas. 
The need for new paradigms in 
research and practice 
It is increasingly recognized that inade- 
quate perspectives and poorly adapted 
management practices are compounding 
problems and contributing to uncertainty. 
This forces us to move beyond external 
causes to examine "internal" causes-our 
perspectives and methods, as well as the 
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FIGURE 1, A AND B Increase in major natural disasters (A) and economic -losses (B) since 
1950. The trend curves verify the alarming increase in losses from disasters in the past 5 
decades. (Source: Munich Re Group 2003) 
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social patterns that contribute to the risk 
of disaster. 
"Internal" rather than "external" focus 
We must first overcome denial: difficulties 
in quantifying uncertainty often lead to a 
failure to address uncertainty at all, espe- 
cially with regard to social processes. As a 
result, we use reductionist approaches to 
study natural disaster-related aspects 
whose driving forces can be tightly con- 
trolled and manipulated, ie, external fac- 
tors such as geophysical processes that we 
can engineer. 
At the same time, we often avoid the 
study of complex human-nature interac- 
tions, for which we often lack social and 
environmental data at the appropriate 
spatial and temporal scales. Traditional 
hazard mitigation policy considers natu- 
ral hazards as isolated, linear processes. 
With flooding, for example, most risk 
analyses consider a line of causality that 
proceeds from meteorological conditions 
through temporal and spatial variability 
to the (economic) impact of floods on 
society. This emphasis on nature as a set 
of determinants, without adequate inte- 
gration of social, political, legislative and 
biophysical contexts, has led to a narrow 
focus on geophysical processes and risk 
exposure, and a preference for technical 
fixes and structural measures in risk man- 
agement. On the other hand, many social 
scientists model disasters as primarily 
negative events with solely economic 
impacts on society and, consequently, 
most models reflect only utilitarian func- 
tions both abstracted from the biophysi- 
cal world and from socio-ecological con- 
sequences. 
Complex rather than linear approaches 
Hence natural risk management options 
reflect a biased analysis of causality, and 
present linear cause-and-effect approaches 
that blind us to the reality of how complex 
adaptive systems operate at multiple lev- 
els. Since most people see life as a series 
of events and ignore system structure 
(feedback loops) and behavior (delays, 
emerging properties with unexpected 
impacts), disasters are rarely viewed as arn 
integral part of a much larger develop- 
ment context. 
As a result, policy options are con- 
strained to reactionary, end-of-the-pipeline 
responses such as emergency management 
or humanitarian assistance. Unsurprisingly, 
disaster management is an event-focused 
reaction, based on schemes and programs 
that treat those affected as "clients," with a 
culture of experts and technology that do 
things to and for them, rather than together 
with them. Communicating and transport- 
ing different ideas and concepts between 
social systems is still problematic, given the 
different operating principles and vocabu- 
laries in disaster-related science and policy. 
Traditional flood engineering, for instance, 
provides concrete results that relieve anxi- 
ety about uncertainty but often reduce 
options for adding natural capacity to 
absorb runoff and flexibly integrate differ- 
ent disciplines that could also contribute to 
flood prevention. 
Increasing resilience 
How can we broaden the focus of risk man- 
agement to simultaneously decrease the 
impacts of disasters and increase the capaci- 
ty to respond, while working between crises 
to increase the resilience and adaptiveness 
of society to natural hazards? Above all, we 
must improve our understanding of func- 
tional uncertainties in complex dynamic sys- 
tems and broaden cooperation throughout 
society, across different sectors, disciplines, 
political borders, and spatial and temporal 
scales. This requires integration of manage- 
ment and development policy over the 
short, medium and long terms, as well as 
generation and adoption of paradigms that 
reflect our emerging understanding of 
processes operating at a variety of temporal 
and spatial scales (see Box 1 and Figure 2). 
We therefore recommend the establishment 
of a disaster-related science policy forum 
that elaborates holistic programs--tempo- 
rally and financially adapted to the long- 
term horizon of disaster-related problems-- 
and thereby addresses and communicates 
problems of uncertainty. 
A narrow, event-oriented, reductionist 
view cannot portray holistically complex 
dynamic systems. Scientific education 
should be restructured to include courses 
and training in system dynamics, helping 
students to perceive themselves as a part 
of a larger ecosystem, one in which their 
"People now live in 
more risky areas and 
the vulnerability of the 
insured objects has 
increased -for example 
if a PC or television gets 
wet, you have to throw 
it away. " (lens 
Mehlhorn, head of the 
flood group at Swiss Re 
in Zurich) 
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Can we learn from an integrated early warning system designed over 200 years ago? 
"It is a tragic irony that 
1998, the penultimate 
year of the Disaster 
Reduction Decade, was 
also a year in which 
natural disasters 
increased so dramati- 
cally[...]. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that 
the term 'natural'for 
such events is a mis- 
nomer. " (UN Secretary- 
General Kofi Annan at 
the closing ceremonies 
for the UN Internation- 
al Decade for Natural 
Disaster Reduction in 
'999) 
Natural hazards are embedded in a spatial 
and temporal context; improvement of 
approaches to deal with them requires inter- 
disciplinary research teams and advanced 
research methods. Historical and autobio- 
graphical research bears significant potential 
for hazard research because it enables those 
exposed to disaster to ensure that their risk 
perceptions are recorded and integrated into 
culturally sensitive bottom-up mitigation 
strategies and disaster reduction programs. 
Moreover, participatory research methodolo- 
gies make it possible for communities and 
researchers to gain a better understanding of 
issues affecting communities. Thus, research 
becomes a reciprocal process in which tradi- 
tional top-down hierarchies are dismantled 
and all participants become equal collabora- 
tors, for the benefit of cost-efficient risk man- 
agement. 
Natural disasters such as floods do not 
occur in a social or historical vacuum. This is 
why flood hazard research needs to combine 
knowledge of social and natural factors, as 
well as historical and contemporary approach- 
es and tools. Societies exposed to natural dis- 
asters should not be assessed ahistorically- 
as is often done after great flood disasters, 
where post-disaster esearch and reports 
focus mainly on meteorological conditions, 
geo-hydrological aspects, and technical fixes 
and measures. Based on a comparative 
assessment of a contemporary prediction sys- 
tem and a 200-year-old early flood warning 
system on the Elbe river in Saxony, Germany 
(Figure 2), recent hazard research suggests 
that there is a need to support he (re-)devel- 
opment of a collective memory regarding large- 
scale natural disasters, in order to increase 
contemporary awareness and adapt response 
mechanisms. Indeed, today the different com- 
ponents of flood early warning systems are fre- 
quently considered in isolation, and expensive 
flood forecasting is promoted without ade- 
quately addressing the distribution a d imple- 
mentation of flood warnings-as was demon- 
strated by the Elbe river flood in 2002. 
Historical research has revealed that along 
the same problematic stretch of river, more 
than 200 years ago the authorities already suc- 
cessfully stemmed major flood risks for many 
decades, after massive damage resulting from 
an extreme vent in February 1784. In the win- 
ter of 1798/99, realizing that the weather pat- 
tern might recreate the dangerous conditions of 
1784, with a frozen river and enormous 
amounts of snow accumulated upstream, which 
could suddenly thaw, leading to huge ice blocks 
and water masses invading the area, the Saxon 
authorities designed an elaborate early warning 
system based on collective close observation 
of the environment and involvement ofthe pop- 
ulation and the army. A legal act was passed to 
regulate flood prevention measures, including 
the implementation f 16 signal cannons along 
the Saxon Elbe river. The army was instructed 
to make the ice masses explode with bombs 
and cannon balls if necessary. Officers were 
asked to reconnoiter the hazardous areas along 
the riverbanks where ice was known to have 
accumulated before, and to determine the best 
routes for intervention. If bombing the ice 
masses was found not to suffice and sudden 
flooding was to be expected, the army was 
instructed to use signal cannons to warn the 
population downstream. An existing procedure 
was refined to operate this acoustic warning 
system. Starting with the warning post furthest 
upstream within Saxony, each post was to 
shoot three warning signals for the guard fur- 
ther down the valley as soon as the ice jam- 
ming broke up or the water rose beyond a cer- 
tain level. The population was thus warned ear- 
ly enough to be able to protect itself and its 
actions help to shape the Earth in ways 
large or small, positive and negative. On 
the practical side, we must enhance flexi- 
bility by emphasizing science as a process 
that fosters reassessment and is integrated 
with management practices. 
One collaborative framework that has 
proven useful in disaster management is 
Adaptive Management, which allows peo- 
ple involved in science, policy-making, 
economic affairs and education to collab- 
orate in developing and communicating 
new ideas and practices to address uncer- 
tainty. Such citizen-science dialogues 
broaden stakeholder participation in for- 
mulating and criticizing goals, constraints, 
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FIGURE 2 Comparative view of early flood warning systems along the Saxon stretch of the Elbe in Germany: the 
closely linked 1799 signal cannon system and the electronic prediction system refurbished after the 2002 flood. 
(Sketch by Juergen Weichselgartner) 
"Mitigation has to be 
done at the local level. 
The people living in 
hazard-prone areas and 
having practical knowl- 
edge and experience 
have to be involved in 
the planning processes. 
We should not dictate 
mitigation frm the top 
down; but financing it 
is another question." 
(Interview with Markus 
Priesterath, instructor 
at the Kuratorium 
Fluthilfe, Department of 
the Interior, Germany, 
after the 200oo2 Elbe 
flood) 
possessions against impending flooding. Imple- 
mentation of this system reduced massive dam- 
age and casualties. The local authorities also 
had to ensure that sufficient personnel and infra- 
structure were available to protect the dikes, 
defrost bridges, and provide the population with 
food and clothing whenever necessary. 
By re-activating such historical data, hazard 
and disaster researchers could help broaden 
contemporary hazard research perspectives, 
develop a collective disaster memory, and design 
adequate self-help measures adapted to local 
environments. 
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different scenarios and policy options, so 
that political "buy-in" increases. 
Whatever approach we use must con- 
tribute to an ongoing process that does 
not focus on isolated physical processes 
or single events but on human develop- 
ment as a whole. In this regard, scientists 
and practitioners have to increase their 
awareness of the linkages between disas- 
ters and development, and the implica- 
tions of these linkages for their work. In 
practice, disaster and development are 
treated in different arenas within the edu- 
cational and political system: separate 
ministries, disciplines, departments, pro- 
grams, budgets, literature, and space and 
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TABLE 1 Proposals for 
disaster-related research and 
practice to adopt diverse views 
and techniques. (Modified after 
Weichselgartner and 
Obersteiner 2002) 
From... ...to 
Hazard/risk concept Vulnerability/resilience co pt 
Local focus Broader context 
Short-term results Long-term relationship funding 
Equilibrium thinking Critical state behavior 
Prediction Complex understanding 
Symptoms Causal analysis across scales 
Single parameter Integrated research 
Quantitative physical studies Qualitative social studies 
Physical process-based approaches Site hazard approaches 
Reports by experts Science policy forums 
Event-oriented re uctionism Systems thinking 
Re-active management Pro-active management 
Expert planning Stakeholder participation 
Top-down organization Bottom-up organization 
Command-and-control solutions Social audit solutions 
Intervention Self-help and capacity building 
Response Mitigation 
Probabilities Possibilities 
time frames, often with minimal relation 
to each other. 
Disaster management is more than 
the science of adept reaction to crisis or a 
policy of professionalized, event-focused 
response. Rather, it must become a contin- 
uous effort o assess all processes that 
influence risk at all scales. Such flexible 
learning processes increase our resilience 
to shock, as we diminish the impact of dis- 
turbance and increase our adaptability to 
uncertainty. To move beyond entrenched 
concepts that can block new ideas and 
methods, we need to use techniques such 
as modeling and employ all the informa- 
tion available to improve our knowledge 
about system behavior in crisis. We also 
need to enhance "Double Loop Learning" 
by making our paradigms explicit and sub- 
ject to revision. Table 1 lists suggestions 
that might help integrate diverse views 
and techniques into disaster-related 
research and practice. 
Future courses of action 
The "precautionary principle" was recent- 
ly proposed at the European level as a par- 
adigm to further promote risk-related ia- 
logue. As we have seen, the farther we 
look into the future, the more uncertain 
we are about functional relationships, 
interdependencies and outcomes. And 
since we can never predict with certainty 
what action-or lack of action-will trig- 
ger a disaster, we cannot define with cer- 
tainty what it is that requires precaution. 
We appear trapped in cycles of recurring 
disasters when, in the face of such contin- 
uing uncertainty, technical solutions 
remain the dominant scientific approach 
and the default bureaucratic reflex. 
Science and policy require more than 
technology or structural defense measures 
to address uncertainty. They involve 
human action-a social process in which 
knowledge and convictions are created 
Mountain Research and Development Vol 24 No 1 Feb 2004 
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FIGURE 3 The result of a 
"Space for Rivers" initiative in 
Switzerland: the resilience of 
the Emme valley to flooding 
has been increased by allowing 
part of the Emme to return to 
its natural riverbed. This 
structural measure is cost- 
efficient, protects the river 
against undesired influx (thus 
improving water quality), helps 
conserve a natural ecosystem, 
and improves the quality of 
recreation areas. View of the 
Emme near Utzenstorf. (Photo 
courtesy of the Federal Office 
for Water and Geology, FOWG) 
rather than certainties. Both the Nether- 
lands and Switzerland offer good exam- 
ples ("Space for Rivers" initiatives) of 
stakeholder-driven collaboration between 
society and scientists that is developing 
innovative approaches to flood hazards 
(Figure 3). Recognizing that engineered 
solutions cannot deliver full flood security, 
these programs allow experimentation 
with new policies and practices that 
increase society's resilience to floods and 
reestablish natural processes as the struc- 
turing agents for the river basin. Similar 
programs could help confront hreats to 
mountain ecosystems-including invasive 
species, land degradation, natural haz- 
ards, pollution, fragmentation, and mass 
tourism-by experimenting with innova- 
tive views, theories, policies and practices 
to address conflicts emerging from the 
twin goals of preserving nature and pro- 
moting development. 
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